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Abstract 
 
The co-existence of conventional and transgenic products in the food chain introduces new 
elements in the evaluation of the profitability of transgenic crops and, consequently, on the 
farmer’s adoption decision. In particular, one emerging problem farmers are facing in Europe 
is related to the legal liability of transgenic crop cultivation. In Europe, a mixture of ex-ante 
regulations and ex-post liability rules governing transgenic crops emerges.  
One of the predominant ex-ante regulations discussed at the EU-level is a minimum distance 
requirement to neighbouring fields in order to avoid cross-pollination. The ex-post liability 
rules differ. They depend on the legal frameworks of individual members of the EU. The 
current interpretation of, for example, Italian and German law does not exclude ex-post 
liability for farmers planting transgenic crops in the case of cross-pollination. 
In this paper, we analyze the value of planting transgenic crops when farmers face ex-ante 
regulatory and ex-post liability costs under irreversibility and uncertainty. The regulatory 
instrument analyzed is the minimum distance to neighbouring fields. First results indicate that 
under irreversibility and uncertainty the value of cultivating transgenic crops presents a trade-
off between ex-ante regulatory and ex-post liability costs with respect to farm size. From this, 
it is not possible to conclude a priori the net effect on the size of the adopting farms, if, ceteris 
paribus, a minimum distance regulation is adopted within the EU and farmers can be held 
liable ex-post.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The cultivation of biotech crops is continuously expanding worldwide. According to the 
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (James, 2002), 58.7 
million hectares were planted with Genetically Modified (GM) organisms in 2002, an increase 
of 12% over the previous year. This involved nearly 6 million farmers. The United States 
(66.4%), Argentina (23.0%), Canada (6.0%) and China (2.1%) have the largest world share of 
transgenic crops. However, new countries are emerging: for example in 2002 India, Colombia 
and Honduras introduced biotech crops in their fields.  
Considering the different commodities, soybean production has the largest world share with 
36.5 million hectares in 2002. Cultivation of this crop has expanded so much in the last years 
that today transgenic soybean represents more than half of the total world production of these 
seeds. This crop is followed in importance by maize with 12.4 million hectares, cotton with 6.8 
million hectares, and canola with 3 million hectares. 
 
Considering that in 1996 the total area of GM crops was less than 3 million hectares, the 
adoption has undoubtedly been rapid and massive. The economic reasons are mainly 
considered in farmers’ expectations on the profitability of transgenic crops, in particular as 
regards yield and/or cost savings. However, as reviewed by Demont and Tollens (2001) 
studies often do not show a significant difference in profitability between conventional and GM 
crops when yields and costs are considered. One important factor in determining the choice 
of transgenic crops is the convenience given to the farmer (Marra, 2001). These crops allow 
for a greater flexibility in growing practices that reduces the time specificity of labour and 
capital. This can translate into increased labour productivity and impact on farm restructuring. 
Moreover, as the report of the Directorate-General for Agriculture of the European Union 
underlines, “…the effective profitability of a GM crop can only be properly assessed on the 
basis of several years of cultivation and commercialization. Several years have to be 
considered for two main reasons. First, many other factors have an impact on profitability. In 
particular, there are important yearly fluctuations in yields and prices. Second, effective 
profitability depends on developments on the supply and on the demand side” (EC, 2000, 
chapter 3). 
 
Initial development and adoption of transgenic crops were supply driven. The target of biotech 
firms was the farmer and the crops produced had agronomic traits that favoured farm 
practices and output volumes. However, upstream effects from the demand side started to be 
important as the consumer’s awareness and knowledge of GM organisms increased. 
Consumer concern about the possible negative effects of biotech on health and the 
environment induced part of the population, even in countries where GM cultivation is largely 
allowed, to demand GM-free products (Winston, 2002). As a consequence, a double channel 
may develop, one including GM products and the other GM-free. This implies the segregation 
of agricultural products along the vertical food chain and the eventual development of an 
Identity Preservation (IP) and a traceability system together with opportune labelling 
requirements (Gaisford et al., 2002). The co-existence of conventional and transgenic 
products in the food chain introduces new elements in the evaluation of the profitability of GM 
crops and, consequently, on the farmer’s adoption decision. In particular, one emerging 
problem farmers are facing is related to the legal liability of GM cultivation. As will be 
discussed in the next section, farmers face the risk of litigation with neighbouring farmers, 
biotech companies and public institutions. This introduces a new element in the farm adoption 
process. The value of the new technology will not only depend on the incremental changes in 
revenues and variable production costs but also on costs from ex-ante regulations and ex-
post liability. 
 
However, while it is possible to enumerate the factors influencing the farmer’s actions when 
considering the adoption of biotech crops, the direction and interrelation of their effects is not 
clearly defined. For example, what is the influence of an ex-ante regulation imposing 
standards for GM cultivation? It probably increases field costs while reducing legal liability. 
Given that, at least at the EU level, there is much debate on the type and level of regulation 
that should be adopted in order to govern co-existence, the purpose of the study is to 
highlight the implication on farm’s GM adoption of an ex-ante regulation setting standards for 
GM farm cultivation practices in combination with ex-post liability rules. Awareness of  these 
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effects can help to evaluate the consequences of policy actions and, eventually to identify the 
impact of those policy instruments on adoption of the new technology. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, legal issues related to co-existence are 
discussed, followed by a model that values transgenic crops including ex-ante regulations 
and ex-post liability rules at farm level. Third, the effects of changes in regulations and liability 
rules on adoption are discussed before we conclude. 
 
2. Legal issues of co-existence 
 
There are different sources of litigation that can hold a GM farmer liable for his cultivation 
practices. Actions are likely to be taken by non-GM farmers that consider their business 
damaged when GM contamination occurs. This is summarized in the following paragraphs: 
 
Product depreciation 
 
A farmer growing GM crops can be sued by neighbouring non-GM farmers who find their 
crops contaminated by GM material. The mixing of GM and non-GM material can result from 
cross-pollination or volunteers (self-sown plants) carried by different agents (wind, animals…) 
from the GM field to the neighbouring soils (Kershen 2002, Schmidt 2002). Contamination 
causes harm to non-GM farmers since they risk not being able to sell their products as GM-
free, with negative consequences on the value of the product1. This is especially true in the 
case of organic production, where the utilization of GM products is excluded. Financial losses 
to organic farmers can also be higher if the adventitious GM contamination implies the loss of 
their organic status: in this case the access to important markets could be precluded for 
several years.  
 
Litigation is not limited to neighbouring farmers but can also occur between landlords and 
tenants. A landlord can claim that the loss of organic status due to GM cultivation has a 
negative impact on the land value and that the tenant did not comply with the rules of “good 
husbandry” included in many tenancy agreements (NCF 2003). As the network of concerned 
farmers (NCF) underlines, depreciation of land can also cause concerns to banks, when 
secured loans are linked to the land value. Hence, if GM cultivation is proved to have effects 
on land values, landlords and banks could play a role in engaging legal disputes with the 
responsible GM farmer. 
 
Legal actions by biotech companies 
 
Companies producing GM seed invest a great deal of effort in protecting their property rights 
on the use of transgenic crops. Especially for those crops, such as oil-seed rape, where it is 
possible for the farmer to use seeds kept from the harvest of the previous year, contracts 
between farmers and agbiotech companies explicitly state that the farmer cannot use as seed 
their own harvested GM crops (and, of course, they cannot give or sell seeds to other 
farmers). Moreover, companies reserve the right to control and take samples from harvested 
crops of the farms in the following years.  
 
The behaviour of agbiotech companies has consequences both on GM and non-GM farms as 
recent court cases demonstrate. Well known is the case of a Canadian farmer (Schmeiser) 
sued by Monsanto and held liable by the Federal Court of Canada (FCC 2001). The farmer 
was found guilty of knowingly growing canola containing a gene patented by Monsanto (gene 
Roundup® tolerant). One of the motivations of the judge that held the farmer liable was that 
“…a farmer whose field contains seed or plants originating from seed spilled into them, or 
blown as seed, in swaths from a neighbour’s land or even growing from germination by pollen 
carried into his field from elsewhere by insects, birds, or by the wind, may own the seed or 
plants on his land even if he did not set about to plant them. He does not, however, own the 
right to the use of the patented gene, or of the seed or plant containing the patented gene or 
cell” (FCC 2001, p. 92). The farmer was considered guilty because he used seeds knowing 
they included the Monsanto gene: as the judge writes “his infringement arises not simply from 
occasional or limited contamination of his Roundup susceptible canola by plants that are 
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Roundup resistant. He planted his crop for 1998 with seed that he knew or ought to have 
known was Roundup tolerant” (FCC 2001, p. 125).  
 
The above case highlights the importance of the effects of contamination. Legal actions by 
biotech companies put pressure on farmers to identify GM contamination and to take action to 
eliminate such plants from the field. However, this influences the farming practices and there 
is no unanimous opinion on the effect on costs and the effectiveness of the control2. 
 
Damages to the downstream vertical chain 
 
Labelling of food products is an important issue related to biotechnology. Bodies such as the 
European Union (EU) require labelling of food products as GM if they contain more than 1% 
of transgenic material. Also, firms can voluntarily certify their products as GM-free or organic 
with a guarantee of a certifying institution. One key element in this system is the maintenance 
of a separate channel of GM-free products and the possibility to trace back the food 
components up to the producing farmer. This implies that, if GM contamination is found in the 
food product, liability can be transferred to the responsible non-GM farmer (if any). Hence, the 
cost of contamination would not only be the depreciation of the product, but also the payment 
for damages caused to the downstream food chain. According to NCF (2003), this would 
expose farmers to high liability levels with difficulties also in obtaining an insurance coverage. 
These facts would be a further incentive for the non-GM farmer to sue neighbouring GM 
producers, with an overall increase of legal disputes. 
 
In conclusion, farmers adopting transgenic crops face the risk of being held liable if they plant 
transgenic crops. Also, the introduction of transgenic crops often includes regulations, such 
as the refuge areas for Bt-corn in the United States. In the EU, minimum distance 
requirements to avoid cross-pollination are discussed. The distance requirements discussed 
range from a few meters up to several thousand meters (agnet 2002, Bock 2002). However, 
the risk of being held liable depends on the specific liability systems of the different countries. 
This will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3. Legislation and specificities of different countries 
 
GM farmer’s liability is likely to be included in the category of “damage to property” (so-called 
traditional damage). More specifically, this can be distinguished in two main categories: 
negligence and strict liability. Negligence, in the biotech case, occurs when the farmer fails to 
take adequate action in order to avoid GM contamination. If it can be proved that the GM 
farmer did not provide sufficient care (did not meet the standards established by law) in order 
to avoid contamination and that this caused prejudice to the non-GM farmer, the former could 
be held liable by the court. On the other hand, strict liability does not require fault or 
negligence by the person who caused harm. Hence, a farmer can be held liable simply 
because his activity is causing damages. 
 
In order to evaluate the relationship between ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability on the 
farmer’s GM adoption decision, the relevant question is whether strict liability is indeed 
applicable to the GM farmer3. The answer is different depending on the countries considered: 
as will be discussed below, in the US strict liability is not likely to occur, whereas there are 
more possibilities in the European Union.  
 
US legislation 
 
In the US the regime of legal liability, biotechnology is regulated by laws that are generally 
applicable to agricultural products. Biotechnology in agriculture is considered by the US 
legislation as equivalent to other agricultural breeding practices (OSTP, 1986, General 
Recommendation 2).  
 
In order to claim, strict liability damages have to be demonstrated. For example, in the case of 
organic production the organic standards are set by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) under the federal law given by the National Organic Program (NOP). The 
program explicitly states that the use of GM organisms is excluded for organic production. 
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However, it is a process based standard. USDA does not set specific tolerance levels for the 
presence of GM material. It is sufficient to respect the production standards to obtain the 
certification. Therefore, “…organic producers may face significant difficulties in proving that 
the farmer growing transgenic crops caused damage” (Kershen, 2002, p.7). Even if the 
organic farmer complies with stricter private standards (from a non-governmental institution) 
the court under the US legislation could consider it an “abnormally sensitive character” of the 
plaintiff’s activity (Kershen, 2002).  
 
Moreover, as underlined by (Kershen, 2002, p.12-13), in the US  “…courts are unlikely to 
endorse [claims] that insist on zero tolerance of pollen flow or volunteer plants. Courts expect 
neighbors to have reasonable tolerances toward one another as the court engages in 
balancing of gravity of the harm against the social utility of each neighbor’s use and 
enjoyment of their own land”. The basis of the court’s view is the substantial equivalence, in 
the US case, of the biotech cultivation to the traditional farming practices.  
 
From the above discussion it appears that the possibility of legal actions against a GM farmer 
are limited according to the US legislation over biotech practices. Excluding negligence, the 
non-GM farmer will have a hard task demonstrating that transgenic cultivation caused 
significant damage.  
 
EU legislation 
 
In the EU, damage to property is not covered by EU legislation (or proposals) and is left to the 
civil liability systems of the Member States (EC, 2002b). Moreover, from the policy debate on 
co-existence, it seems that much will be left to the specific legislations of Member States. In 
this regard, the following paragraphs will discuss the examples of  Italian and German 
legislation. 
 
Italian and German legislation 
 
In this context, the starting point of the Italian legislation is article 844 of the Civil Code 
stating: “a farmer cannot impede the emission of smoke, heat, odours, noise, vibrations, and 
similar propagations originating from a neighbouring field, if they to not exceed the normal 
tolerability while taking into account the conditions of the area”. The emission can be 
forbidden if it is “intolerable”, that is it has to be over any reasonable tolerance of its external 
effects (Germanò, 2002). A similar position can be found in Germany. §903 of the German 
Civil Code is similar to the article 844 of the Italian Civil Code. In combination with §906 of the 
German Civil Code organic farmers have to tolerate cross-pollination as long as this does not 
impose important constraints on their freedom to farm and if cross-pollination can be avoided 
by methods that are tolerable from an economic point of view. However, there is no precise 
definition of reasonable cost and considerable economic losses. Hence, the point is to define 
the nature and the level at which an emission can be considered “intolerable”.  
 
Different EU legislations pose constraints to non-GM farmers. For example, under regulation 
2092/91 as amended by regulation 1804/99, organic farmers can receive  certification for their 
products only if they avoid GM products in their farming practices. In Italy, farmers receiving 
subsidies within the framework of the regional Rural Development Plan (RDP) are often 
required to produce GM-free products. Also, the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) 
certification requires practices that do not allow the use of GM products. However, although 
PDO and organic certification are process based, the eventual contamination of GM material 
would preclude their labelling status if the GM content were over a threshold level. This has 
been defined at 1% for food (EC 49/2000) and 0.1% for organic products are discussed.4 In 
the first case food would loose its organic status, while in the second case the product has to 
be labelled as GM. Hence, the key difference with respect to the US legislation is the 
mandatory labelling system: the definition of intolerable emission is likely to depend on its 
size and could be determined by the court on a case by case basis. 
 
The European case illustrates that farmers planting transgenic crops risk ex-post liability 
costs, even if ex-ante regulations are implemented. The legal framework in the United States 
reduces the risk of ex-post liability costs. While ex-post liability will be less relevant for 
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adoption of transgenic crops in the US, they may pose important additional adoption costs to 
farmers in the EU. 
 
In the next step we model the value of transgenic crops at farm level including ex-ante 
regulatory and ex-post liability costs. The regulation we use is the minimum distance a farmer 
planting transgenic crops has to keep between his field and neighbouring fields to reduce 
cross-pollination. We show that indeed, ex-post liability adds additional costs that reduce the 
likelihood of adoption and, what is also important, that they will not be scale neutral. 
 
4. Theoretical framework for the GM farmer 
 
As underlined in the previous section, the farmer’s decision on whether to adopt a GM crop is 
not a simple one. The value of adopting a transgenic crop depends not only on the 
incremental profit from growing the transgenic crops, but also on ex-ante regulatory and ex-
post liability costs. 
 
4.1 Ex-ante regulation and ex-post liability 
 
The starting point of the conceptual framework is the definition of the GM farmer’s value 
function. The value of the option to adopt the GM crop can be defined as the expected value 
of the difference between the extra profit obtainable from the GM cultivation (as compared to 
the conventional one) considering the sole cultivation practices () and the costs related to 
liability and its control (L): 
 
)( LEV  . (1) 
 
If, for the moment, we assume that the farmer does not face any reduction in costs related to 
the adoption of a transgenic crop, he/she is assumed to adopt the transgenic crop when V is 
equal or grater than zero. The expected costs related to liability are the sum of the costs of 
respecting ex-ante regulations (C) and the value of tort liability (TL): 
 
)( TLCEL  .  (2) 
 
Following Kolstad et al. (1990) the above relation can be reformulated as 
 
RDCL     (3) 
 
where,  is the probability of causing an accident (for example, contamination of the 
neighbouring non-GM fields), D is the monetary value of the accident, and R is the probability 
that the injurer will pay the damages. In our case, R can be interpreted as a function of the 
court view and the probability of being sued by the neighbour who has suffered damage.  
 
From the previous equations the value function for the GM farmer can be formulated as 
follows: 
       )law(Rreg,sD)reg,s(reg,sCs,c,y,pEV    (4) 
 
where p is a vector of output prices, y is the vector of the per-hectare yields, c is the vector of 
the cost of inputs, s is the size of the field, reg is the enforced GM legal standard for the 
country, law is the tort liability system of the country and E the expectation operator. 
 
The above framework can be used to assess the impact of regulation standards on a farm’s 
adoption of GM crops. One possibility is to evaluate the effect of the variable reg on the 
“relevant” farm size. The relevant farm size for the given problem is the dimension at which 
the cultivation of the GM crop starts to be convenient, that is the value function is greater or 
equal to zero.  
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Assuming the farm is a single field and interpreting the variable reg as the minimum distance 
(d) between the GM crop and the farm’s external limits, it is possible to evaluate the 
relationship between the minimum adoption size (s) and the severity of regulation. Assuming 
all of the other variables are constant, s  can be solved form the following equation: 
       0,),(,  RdsDdsdsCsV   (5) 
where,   0 ss  and   022  orss ; 
  0,  sdsC  and   0, 22  sdsC ; 
  0,  ddsC  and   0, 22  ddsC ; 
  0,  sds  and   0, 22  sds ; 
  0,  dds and   0, 22  dds ; 
  0,  sdsD  and   0, 22  sdsD ;  
  0,  ddsD and   0, 22  ddsD . 
 
From the implicit function theorem it is possible to write  
 
sV
dVds 
 , 
 
hence applying the above relation to equation (5) the resulting expression is 
  
   sdsdsDsdsDdsRsCss
ddsdsDddsDdsRdCds 

),(),(),(),(
),(),(),(),(

  (6) 
 
Given that at the break even point s an increase in size determines a higher increase in the 
extra profit than in the implementation and liability costs, the denominator of the above 
equation can be assumed to be positive around s. Hence, the discussion can be focused on 
the numerator of the equation. For simplicity, ignore the denominator and rewrite equation (6) 
as 
     ddsdsDddsDdsRdCds  ),(),(),(),(sign  sign  . (7) 
 
The first term on the right hand side of the above equation is positive, while the second term 
is negative. With an increase in distance there is a trade-off between an increase in 
implementation costs and a decrease in the expected value of liability. This implies that the 
effect on the minimum adoption size of a policy that poses higher standards on distances 
between GM and non-GM fields is uncertain. Hence, it is not possible to conclude that an 
increase in distance will exclude smaller farms. Indeed, if the decrease in expected liability is 
superior to the increase in implementation costs it is possible to have smaller farms adopting 
the technology. Or rather, the more severe legislation would not have any impact, given that 
those smaller farms were already adopting the technology imposing on themselves higher 
crop distances. 
 
4.2 The case of irreversibility and uncertainty 
 
In the previous discussion it was assumed that incremental profits  are certain and the 
farmer did not face reduced costs while deciding to adopt the GM technology. However, it 
could be the case that some of the costs are irreversible: for example, the transgenic crop 
requires specific machinery, or as discussed in the introduction, the GM cultivation could 
make it difficult for the farmer to switch back to the non-GM status. These difficulties could 
include additional practices for the control of volunteers or a required minimum number of 
years of non-GM cultivation for a field to be considered for producing non-GM products. The 
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multi-period time frame also adds uncertainty to the farmers’ adoption decision as future 
yields, prices and costs are not known with certainty.’ 
 
In the presence of net-irreversible costs, uncertainty and flexibility, the value of a GM crop is 
not simply the difference between the present value of future benefits and costs, as from 
equation (1), but the sum of this difference plus the value of the option to plant transgenic 
crops (Wesseler, 2003). More formally, when some costs are irreversible, costs and benefits 
are uncertain and the decision to invest can be postponed, the farmer maximizes the option 
value of the investment. Hence, equation (1) can be reformulated as follows 
   TeI)TL,C,(VEmax)V(F    (8) 
 
where F(V) is the value of the investment opportunity, V(, C, TL) is the value of the 
reversible net-benefits, and I are the net-irreversible costs of the investment.  
 
As the time frame gets longer than a sowing season, the benefit of using a GM crop becomes 
uncertain. Profit from farm practices can change over time and there is always the risk of 
liability. It is possible to represent this uncertainty by the following stochastic process 
        dqCdzCdtCCd    (9) 
 
where (-C) evolves under a combined geometric Brownian motion and Poisson process. 
The first two terms are common for modelling incremental benefits of transgenic crops (e.g. 
Demont et al., 2003; Morel et al. 2003; Wesseler, 2003).  is the drift of the Brownian motion, 
dz is the increment of a Wiener process, dt is the marginal increment in time and dq is the 
increment of a Poisson process. The third term represents tort liability modelled as the risk of 
a jump in the profit when the farmer is held liable. More precisely, 
 
dtdz t , and  


dty probabilitwith -
dt-1y probabilitwith 

0
dq  
 
where t is normally distributed with zero mean and unit standard deviation,  is the 
mean arrival rate of a Poisson process, and  the percentage of the ex-post liability costs of 
(-C).  
From the above equation and the opportune boundary conditions, as shown in 
Appendix 1, it is possible to obtain the following relation defining the rule for the investment 
decision, assuming   = 1: 
I)(
1
)C(
1
1* 
 



   (10) 
 
where 
 
  12
2
1
2
1
2
2
221 

  




 .  (11) 
 
From the last two equations it is possible to evaluate the effect of a change in the regulation 
regarding co-existence. Taking again as an example the case of the distance between GM 
and non-GM fields it is possible to see the effect of an increase in distance on the hurdle rate, 
assuming I/d = 0. The same approach used in the case without irreversibility can be used to 
compare the effects of a change in the regulation on the minimum adoption size of the farm 
(s). This can be solved rearranging equation (10) and applying the implicit function theorem 
leading to the following derivative: 
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   
 
s
I
1s
)C(
I
d1d
1
d
)C(
ds
1
1
1
11
1






































 
(12) 
 
Given that we are observing a break even point, as in the case under certainty it is possible to 
assume that the denominator or the above equation is positive. Hence, equation (12) can be 
rewritten as 
 
   
1
1 1
1
1
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( )sign  sign  Cs d I
d d d

      
  
                               
  
.(13) 
 
5. Results 
 
The result in equation 13 is similar to the case without irreversibility and uncertainty. The first 
term in the square brackets indicates the effect on the hurdle rate, which is positive. This is 
the positive effect of an increase in the future value of transgenic crops due to an increase in 
distance requirements, which can be explained by the decrease in ex-post liability costs (the 
option to wait worth more). The second term in the square brackets is the effect on the 
annualized hurdle rate. This captures the effect on the reversible value of the transgenic crop. 
This effect is negative as an increase in the distance reduces directly the probability of ex-
post liability, which increases the actual value of adopting transgenic crops. The overall sign 
of the terms in the square brackets cannot be determined and will depend on the specific 
parameter values (see the solution in Appendix 2). However, numerical examples show a 
very robust negative sign of the square bracket. This means that with an increase in distance 
requirement the greater value of the investment opportunity is outweighed by the increase in 
the actual value of the project. This is shown in figure 1.  
 
If what described above was the only force in action the effect of the policy would be a lower 
minimum adoption size. However, the increase in the minimum distance determines a raise in 
costs reducing the value of (-C). Hence, for the most common values of the parameters it is 
not possible, a priori, to conclude what is the effect on the minimum adoption size of the ex-
ante regulation. This is shown in figure 2. 
 
Only the case of very high drift rates  and low mean arrival rates , that is, low probability of 
ex-post liability, turns the sign of the square brackets positive. In this case is the option value 
is prevailing and ex-ante regulations would be biased towards larger farms. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The release of transgenic crops in Europe will most likely be controlled by ex-ante regulations 
and ex-post liability rules. The regulations chosen, and liability rules imposed, do affect the 
expected benefits from adopting transgenic crops at farm level. In this paper we have shown 
that for the case of a minimum distance requirement this will not always be scale neutral. 
However, for reasonable parameter ranges the net direction of the effect needs to be verified 
empirically. The presence of irreversible costs seem to play a role in determining ex ante the 
policy effect only in extreme cases. This observation holds for the case where ex-post liability 
costs, if a farmer is held liable, equal the ex-ante expected benefits. We expect the results to 
be similar, if the liability costs are linear in ex-ante expected benefits.  
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Appendix 1 
 
From the definition of the value of the farmer’s investment opportunity in GM crops  
     teICVECF  )(max    (A1) 
 
the investment problem can be solved by dynamic programming. The first step is to define the 
Bellman equation as 
     CdFEdtCF    (A2) 
 
This equation equates the return over dt computed from a capital whose value is F using a 
discount rate   to the expected change in the value of the investment opportunity F. This 
means that the optimality condition for the farmer is when the value of the investment 
opportunity in GM crops changes over time in the same way as a normal capital investment. 
Total liability is still considered the maximization problem and defined as a percentage  of 
(-C) that follows a jump process with a mean arrival rate of . Hence, the following 
combined stochastic processes for (-C) and TL is assumed: 
        dqCdzCdtCCd   .  (A3) 
 
where dz is a Wiener process with the property dtdz t , where t has zero mean and 
unit standard deviation and the relative expected values are E(dz)=0 and E(dz2)=dt, dq is the 
increment of the jump process and  
 


dty probabilitwith -
dt-1y probabilitwith 0


dq . 
 
Using Ito’s lemma for the combined Brownian motion and Poisson process, the expected 
value of dF can be defined as 
 
      
 
   
        dtCFCCF
dtC
C
CFdtC
C
CFdFE






                                                
2
1 22
2
2
 (A4)
 
 
 
Substituting (A4) into (A2) and simplifying for dt gives the following second order differential 
equation 
 
 
   
 
            CFCFCFCC
CFC
C
CF 



 
  1
2
1 22
2
2
 
that can be rearranged as 
 
 
   
 
   
      01)(                                           
2
1 22
2
2





 

CFCF
C
C
CFC
C
CF


 (A5) 
 
Knowing that the value of the investment opportunity must also satisfy the following boundary 
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conditions 
 
( ) 0 0CF      (A6.1) 
ICCF 

)(
)(    (A6.2) 
)(
1)(  
 CF  (A6.3) 
 
a solution must take the form 
 
0 and 1 with )()()( 2121 21   CACACF  (A7) 
 
To ensure condition (A6.1) the coefficient A2 must be assumed equal to zero. Hence, from 
equation (A7), (A5) simplifies to 
 
0)1()()1(
2
1
1
1
2
11   . (A8) 
 
Assuming   = 1 this leads to the solution 
 
1)(2
2
1
2
1
2
2
221 

  




 .  (A9) 
 
Boundary conditions (A6.2 – A6.3) can be used to get the value of the unknown variable A1 
and the optimal value of  (-C) for the investment decision. This results in the following 
relation 
 
IC )(
1
)(
1
1 
 



 .  (A10) 
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Appendix 2 
Given 
( ) 0  and d
d
      the sign of 
1 0
d
   while 011
1






d


. 
This can be easily seen form the following derivative: 
 
ddd 






  11
1
1
1
11
1
)1()1(
1 

 
dd 




 

 




 

 


 











2
1
2
2
22
2
11
1
1
2
1
2
2
22
)(2
2
11)1()1()(2
2
11  
 
 
setting
2
1
2
2
22
)(2
2
11




 

  



K  
 
we can write  
 













1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1






d
K
d
 
 
given that both of the factors of the right hand side are negative, the sign of the derivative is 
positive. Now, what is the prevailing sign of the following derivative? 
 
    
)(
1
1
)(
1
1 )(
1)(
1












 





dd
 
 
substitute for the above result 
 
)(
1
1
1
)(
1 1
1
11
1 





 













d
K
d
 
 
and collect terms 
 
 



















)(
1
1
11 1
1
11
1





 K
d
 
 
The prevailing sign is ambiguous and depends on the specific values of the parameters. 
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Figure 1 – Effect of an increase in distance requirements on the threshold level of 
(-C) for the adopting farm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(-C)/(-+1) - I
 (-C) 
 - I 
(-C)/(-+) - I 
 (-C)1 (-C)*
 F(-C) 
Hurdle rate effect 
Actual value effect 
Legend: 
 = per hectare extra profit of the transgenic crop. 
C = per hectare costs of minimum distance. 
F (-C) = value of the investment opportunity. 
I  = irreversible costs when adopting the technology. 
 = discount rate. 
 = drift of the Brownian motion. 
 = mean arrival rate of the Poisson process. 
1 = mean arrival rate after the increase in distance requirements. 
(-C)* = minimum net extra profit in order to adopt the technology at the initial state. 
(-C)1 = minimum net extra profit in order to adopt the technology after the increase in distance. 
  = net effect on the minimum net extra profit given by the increase in distance. 
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Figure 2 – Effect of an increase in distance requirements on the minimum 
adoption size of the farm (S) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SaSb
b 
(-C)1b (-C)
1
a 
 , C 
 S 
a 
 (-C)* 
S*
Increase in costs effect
Net real option effect (a or 

C
C1
Legend: 
 = per hectare extra profit of the transgenic crop. 
C = per hectare costs of minimum distance. 
(-C)* = minimum net extra profit in order to adopt the technology at the initial state (see figure 1). 
(-C)1a,b = minimum net extra profit in order to adopt the technology after the increase in distance. 
a,b = net effect on the minimum net extra profit given by the increase in distance (see figure 1). 
S* = minimum adoption size at the initial state. 
Sa,b = minimum adoption size after the increase in distance. 
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1 For examples on short and long term impacts of GM contamination on conventional and organic farmers see Bock 
et al.  (2002). 
2 For some authors the control of volunteers can be easily implemented by using other herbicides, such as 2,4-D or 
MCPA, in association with Roundup (ACPC, 1999).  Other scientists see this issue as much more problematic with 
important implications for farm practices (Clark, 2001). Moreover, in the case of canola, the GM farmer willing to 
switch back to the conventional crop will face severe problems due to the control of volunteers with the risk of not 
being able to save seed for the following sowing season and the threat of being sued by the seed developer.  
3 If this is true, as will be clear in the model specification, ex-ante regulations are not the sole forces influencing the 
profitability of the GM crop and, consequently, the adoption decision. 
4 Council Regulation (EC) 1804/1999 of July 19, 1999 under article (10) states that products labelled as organic have 
to be free of genetically modified organisms or parts thereof. As the current analytical limit is at a level of about of 
0.1%, this has been interpreted as a de facto threshold (Bock et al., 2002). 
